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Working Paper
Managing Capital Flows in the Presence of External Risks
We introduce external risks, in the form of shocks to the level and volatility of world interest rates, into a small open economy model subject to the risk of sudden stops?large recessions together with abrupt reversals in capital inflows| and characterize optimal macroprudential policy in response to these shocks. In the model, collateral constraints create a pecuniary externality that leads to "overborrowing" and sudden stops that arise when the constraints bind. The typical sudden stop generated by the model replicates existing empirical evidence for emerging market economies: Low and ...
Journal Article
Matching collateral supply and financing demands in dealer banks
The failure and near-collapse of some of the largest dealer banks on Wall Street in 2008 highlighted the marked vulnerability of the industry. Dealer banks are financial intermediaries that make markets for many securities and derivatives. Like standard banks, dealer banks may derive the funding for a loan from their own equity or from external sources, such as depositors or creditors. Unlike standard banks, however, dealer banks rely heavily upon collateralized borrowing and lending, which give rise to ?internal? sources of financing. This article provides a descriptive and analytical ...
Working Paper
Is a Friend in Need a Friend Indeed? How Relationship Borrowers Fare during the COVID-19 Crisis
We analyze loan contract terms, investigating whether relationship borrowers fare better or worse than others in times of need, using the COVID-19 crisis as a quasi-natural experiment. COVID-19 is superior to prior crises for such analysis because its public health and government restrictions shocks directly harm borrowers, rather than banks. Our dataset includes Y-14Q, covering syndicated and non syndicated loans and small and large firms, unlike some other datasets. We find the dark side of relationships dominates across four relationship measures, 14 COVID-19 shocks, and PPP participation. ...
Working Paper
A Quantitative Theory of Relationship Lending
Banks' loan pricing decisions reflect the fact that borrowers tend to have long-lasting relationships with lenders. Therefore, pricing decisions have an inherently dynamic component: high interest rates may yield higher static profits per loan, but in the long run they erode a banks' customer base and reduce future profitability. We study this tradeoff using a dynamic banking model which embeds lending relationships using deep habits (“customer capital”) and costs of adjusting loan portfolio composition. High customer capital raises the level and decreases the interest rate elasticity of ...
Working Paper
Interest Rates or Haircuts? Prices Versus Quantities in the Market for Collateralized Risky Loans
Markets for risky loans clear on two dimensions - an interest rate (or equivalently a spread above the riskless rate) and a specification of the amount of collateral per dollar of lending. The latter is summarized by the margin or "haircut" associated with the loan. Some key models of endogenous collateral constraints imply that the primary equilibrating force will be in the form of haircuts rather than movements in interest rate spreads. Indeed, an important benchmark model, derived in a two-state world, implies that haircuts will adjust to render all lending riskless, and that a loss of ...
Working Paper
International financial integration, crises, and monetary policy: evidence from the euro area interbank crises
We analyze how financial crises affect international financial integration, exploiting euro area proprietary interbank data, crisis and monetary policy shocks, and variation in loan terms to the same borrower on the same day by domestic versus foreign lenders. Crisis shocks reduce the supply of crossborder liquidity, with stronger volume effects than pricing effects, thereby impairing international financial integration. On the extensive margin, there is flight to home ? but this is independent of quality. On the intensive margin, however, GIPS-headquartered debtor banks suffer in the Lehman ...
Working Paper
Why Do We Need Both Liquidity Regulations and a Lender of Last Resort? A Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending during the 2007-09 U.S. Financial Crisis
During the 2007-09 financial crisis, there were severe reductions in the liquidity of financial markets, runs on the shadow banking system, and destabilizing defaults and near-defaults of major financial institutions. In response, the Federal Reserve, in its role as lender of last resort (LOLR), injected extraordinary amounts of liquidity. In the aftermath, lawmakers and regulators have taken steps to reduce the likelihood that such lending would be required in the future, including the introduction of liquidity regulations. These changes were motivated in part by the argument that central ...
Report
Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?
We use the German Crisis of 1931, a key event of the Great Depression, to study how depositors behave during a bank run in the absence of deposit insurance. We find that deposits decline by around 20 percent during the run and that there is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both ex-post failing and surviving banks. This implies that regular depositors are unable to identify failing banks. In contrast, the interbank market precisely identifies which banks will fail: the interbank market collapses for failing banks entirely but continues to function for ...
Monograph
Mission-oriented banks in Texas and underserved businesses: lessons from the Paycheck Protection Program
The Emergency Capital Investment Program picks up where PPP left off.
Report
The Financial (In)Stability Real Interest Rate, R**
We build a macro-finance model with an occasionally binding financing constraint where real interest rates have opposite effects on current and future financial stability, with the contemporaneous impact driven by valuation effects (akin to those triggering the 2023 banking turmoil) and the future impact driven by reach-for-yield by intermediaries. We use this model to illustrate the concept of the financial stability interest rate, r**, which we propose as a quantitative summary statistic for financial vulnerabilities. We provide a measure of r** for the U.S. economy and discuss its ...