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Showing results 1 to 10 of approximately 43.
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Report
Agency problems and risk taking at banks
The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value--a firm's profit-generating potential--as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence of owner/manager agency problems, managerial risk aversion may also offset the excessive risk taking that stems from moral hazard. Empirical models of bank risk tend to focus either on the disciplinary role of franchise value or on owner/manager agency problems. We estimate a unified model and find ...
Journal Article
The benefits of branching deregulation
When the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act went into effect in June 1997, it marked the final stage of a quarter-century-long effort to relax geographic restrictions on banks. This article examines an earlier stage of the deregulatory process-the actions taken by the states between 1978 and 1992 to remove the barriers to intrastate branching and interstate banking-to determine how the lifting of geographic restrictions affect the efficiency of the banking industry. The analysis reveals that banks' loan losses and operating costs fell sharply following the state ...
Conference Paper
Bankers on boards: monitoring, financing, and lender liability
This paper investigates what factors determine whether a commercial banker joins the board of a non-financial firm and how a banker on the board affects the firm. We consider the trade off between the benefits of bank monitoring to the firm and the costs to the bank of becoming actively involved in firm management. On the one hand, smaller and more volatile firms with few tangible assets might benefit most from close bank ties. On the other, the U.S. legal doctrines "equitable subordination" and "lender liability" could generate high costs for banks which have a representative on the ...
Report
The consolidation of the financial services industry: causes, consequences, and the implications for the future
This article designs a framework for evaluating the causes, consequences, and future implications of financial services industry consolidation, reviews the extant research literature within the context of this framework (over 250 references), and suggests fruitful avenues for future research. The evidence is consistent with increases in market power from some types of consolidation; improvements in profit efficiency and diversification of risks, but little or no cost efficiency improvements on average; relatively little effect on the availability of services to small customers; potential ...
Report
Diversification, size, and risk at bank holding companies
This paper shows that large BHCs are better diversified than small BHCs based on market measures of diversification. We find, however, that better diversification does not translate into reductions in overall risk. The risk reducing potential of diversification at large BHCs is offset by their lower capital ratios, larger C&I loan portfolios, and greater use of derivatives. Our results suggest that asset growth should enhance diversification but that the effects on risk will depend on the extent to which growth is accompanied by changes in portfolio attributes. Using data from 1980 to 1993, ...
Working Paper
The consolidation of the financial services industry: causes, consequences, and implications for the future
This article designs a framework for evaluating the causes, consequences, and future implications of financial consolidation, reviews the extant research literature within the context of this framework (over 250 references), and suggests fruitful avenues for future research. The evidence is consistent with increases in market power from some types of consolidation; improvements in profit efficiency and diversification of risks, but little or no cost efficiency improvements; relatively little effect on the availability of services to small customers; potential improvements in payments system ...
Journal Article
Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value
As protectors of the safety and soundness of the banking system, banking supervisors are responsible for keeping banks' risk taking in check. The authors explain that franchise value--the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern--makes the supervisor's job easier by reducing banks' incentives to take risks. The authors explore the relationship between franchise value and risk taking from 1986 to 1994 using both balance-sheet data and stock returns. They find that banks with high franchise value operate more safely than those with low franchise ...
Report
Securities class actions, corporate governance and managerial agency problems
This paper provides support for the proposition that securities class actions help solve agency problems. Two key findings support this conclusion. First, firms that are more likely to suffer from agency problems are more likely to face class actions. Risky firms, large firms, young firms, low market-to-book firms and non-dividend paying firms as of the end of 1990 were more likely to face a class action filing during the January 1991 to March 1998 period. Second, the probability of CEO turnover increases dramatically after class action filings. The increase can not be explained by omitted ...