Discussion Paper
A framework for analyzing monopolistically competitive price dispersion
Stiglitz, Joseph E.; Salop, Steven C. (1977)
Special Studies Papers , Paper 95

Conference Paper
Perspectives on the role of government risk-bearing
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1991)
Proceedings

Discussion Paper
Bargains and ripoffs: a model of monopolistically competitive price dispersion
Stiglitz, Joseph E.; Salop, Steven C. (1977)
Special Studies Papers , Paper 94

Conference Paper
What we have learned from the recent crises: implications for banking regulation
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1999)
Proceedings , Paper 632

Conference Paper
Economic consequences of income inequality
Furman, Jason; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1998)
Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole

Conference Paper
Macroeconomic models with equity and credit rationing
Stiglitz, Joseph E.; Weiss, Andrew; Greenwald, Bruce C. (1989)
Proceedings

Conference Paper
Monetary policy and the theory of the risk-averse bank
Greenwald, Bruce C.; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1993-03)
Proceedings , Issue Mar

Working Paper
Monetary policy and the theory of the risk-averse bank
Greenwald, Bruce C.; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1993)
Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory , Paper 93-04

Journal Article
Panel discussion: what is the appropriate role of the federal government in the private markets for credit and insurance? what is the outlook?
Litan, Robert E.; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2006-07)
Review , Volume 88 , Issue Jul

Working Paper
Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market
Altinoglu, Levent; Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2020-12-02)
The concentration of risk within financial system is considered to be a source of systemic instability. We propose a theory to explain the structure of the financial system and show how it alters the risk taking incentives of financial institutions. We build a model of portfolio choice and endogenous contracts in which the government optimally intervenes during crises. By issuing financial claims to other institutions, relatively risky institutions endogenously become large and interconnected. This structure enables institutions to share the risk of systemic crisis in a privately optimal way, ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2020-098