Search Results
Working Paper
The Work-from-home Wage Premium
Using administrative data from France, we document that within the same detailed occupation, industry, and commuting zone, workers who work from home earn on average 12% higher hourly wages than fully on-site workers. Approximately half of this wage premium is accounted for by observable worker characteristics (such as education, gender, and age) and firm characteristics (such as size and productivity). The remaining 6% wage premium largely reflects selection: workers who work from home after the COVID-19 pandemic already earned higher wages before the pandemic.
Journal Article
Is Optimism for Artificial Intelligence Boosting Investment?
U.S. business spending related to artificial intelligence (AI) grew substantially in 2025 among publicly traded firms, which account for the bulk of overall investment. Analyzing sentiment data from quarterly company earnings calls can help infer current and evolving optimism towards AI. Public firm data show growth in capital spending and research and development funding has come entirely from the largest companies that are positive about AI. While market concentration among large firms raises some challenges, optimism measures suggest that AI investment will continue to contribute to future ...
Journal Article
Nonmanufacturing as an Engine of Growth
In official statistics, manufacturing is the top contributor to U.S. productivity growth despite its shrinking share of employment. However, official numbers tend to understate growth among new producers that improve on existing producers, which is more prevalent outside of manufacturing. Accounting for such missing productivity growth shows that it plays a larger role in sectors such as retail trade and services. Also, the relative contribution of manufacturing to productivity growth has dropped significantly. These findings suggest that nonmanufacturing may be an increasingly important ...
Working Paper
The Impact of COVID on Productivity and Potential Output
The U.S. economy came into the pandemic, and looks likely to leave it, on a slow-growth path. The near- term level of potential output has fallen because of shortfalls in labor that should reverse over time. Labor productivity, to a surprising degree, has followed an accelerated version of its Great Recession path with initially strong growth followed by weak growth. But, as of mid-2022, it appears that the overall level of labor and total factor productivity are only modestly affected. The sign of the effect depends on whether we use the strong income-side measures of pandemic output growth ...
Working Paper
ChatMacro: Evaluating Inflation Forecasts of Generative AI
Recent research suggests that generic large language models (LLMs) can match the accuracy of traditional methods when forecasting macroeconomic variables in pseudo out-of-sample settings generated via prompts. This paper assesses the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of LLMs by eliciting real-time forecasts of U.S. inflation from ChatGPT. We find that out-of-sample predictions are largely inaccurate and stale, even though forecasts generated in pseudo out-of-sample environments are comparable to existing benchmarks. Our results underscore the importance of out-of-sample benchmarking for LLM ...
Journal Article
What's Holding Back Business Formation?
The pace of business start-ups in the United States has declined over the past few decades. Economic theory suggests that business creation depends on the available workforce, and data analysis supports this strong link. By contrast, the relationship between start-ups and labor productivity is less well-defined, in part because entrepreneurs face initial costs that rise with productivity, specifically their own lost income from alternative employment. Overall, policies that incorporate improving labor availability may help to boost new business growth.
Working Paper
The Impact of COVID on Potential Output
The level of potential output is likely to be subdued post-COVID relative to its previous estimates. Most clearly, capital input and full-employment labor will both be lower than they previously were. Quantitatively, however, these effects appear relatively modest. In the long run, labor scarring could lead to lower levels of employment, but the slow pre-recession pace of GDP growth is unlikely to be substantially affected.
Journal Article
Missing Growth from Creative Destruction
When products disappear from the market with no substitutes from the same manufacturer, they may have been replaced by cheaper or better products from a different manufacturer. Official measurements typically approximate price changes from such creative destruction using price changes for products that were not replaced. This can lead to overstating inflation and, in turn, understating economic growth. A recent estimate suggests that around 0.6 percentage point of growth is missed per year. The bias has not increased over time, however, so it does not explain the slowdown in productivity ...
Working Paper
Innovative Growth Accounting
Recent work highlights a falling entry rate of new firms and a rising market share of large firms in the United States. To understand how these changing firm demographics have affected growth, we decompose productivity growth into the firms doing the innovating. We trace how much each firm innovates by the rate at which it opens and closes plants, the market share of those plants, and how fast its surviving plants grow. Using data on all nonfarm businesses from 1982-2013, we find that new and young firms (ages Oto 5 years) account for almost one-half of growth- three times their share of ...
Journal Article
Is Slow Still the New Normal for GDP Growth?
Estimates suggest the new normal pace for U.S. GDP growth remains between 1% and 1%, noticeably slower than the typical pace since World War II. The slowdown stems mainly from demographic trends that have slowed labor force growth, about which there is relatively little uncertainty. A larger challenge is productivity. Achieving GDP growth consistently above 1% will require much faster productivity growth than the United States has typically experienced since the 1970s.